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Abstract
We examine the e#ect of business group membership on ﬁrm value in each pre- and
postcrisis Korea. Consistent with prior studies, results show that group a$liated chaebol ﬁrms
su#er value discount relative to non-chaebol ﬁrms in the precrisis period. However, we also
ﬁnd that chaebol ﬁrms experience an improvement in ﬁrm value relative to non-chaebol ﬁrms
after the ﬁnancial crisis. These ﬁndings imply that the value discount of business groups
reported in prior studies is not an inevitable consequence of diversiﬁcation, but can be
alleviated or overcome by structural reforms in business practices or economic conditions
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I . Introduction
To maximize ﬁrm value, should ﬁrms stand alone concentrating on a business or organize
diversiﬁed business groups? Results from previous studies on this long-standing question are
mixed. Empirical studies on the e#ects of diversiﬁcation on ﬁrm value using data from U.S.
conglomerates, which often provide dissimilar and conﬂicting results, have painted a murky
picture. Other studies have examined the Japanese keiretsu. Whereas a diversiﬁed ﬁrm in the
United States is usually a single business entity, a keiretsu is a group of independent business
entities operating in various industries but often making uniﬁed investment decisions. Because
an independent ﬁrm usually discloses more detailed information than a segment of a ﬁrm,
studies focusing on the keiretsu are able to assess an individual business unit in a certain
industry more accurately than studies focusing on U.S. conglomerates. Nonetheless, ﬁndings
using data from Japanese keiretsu are also mixed.
Korean business groups, called chaebols, provide several advantages in the attempt to
identify the impact of diversiﬁcation on ﬁrm value. First, member ﬁrms in a keiretsu are
usually monitored, ﬁnanced, and partly owned by a main bank that stands in the center of the
business group. However, although similar to keiretsu in corporate structure, Korean chae-
bols’ member ﬁrms, which are strictly prohibited from a$liating with a bank, are primarily
under the direction of a controlling shareholder or founder’s family who inﬂuences the
investment or ﬁnancing decisions of member ﬁrms. Therefore, the confounding e#ects of the
presence of a main bank are eliminated. Second, without relying on a main bank, chaebols have
extensively developed internal capital markets, similar to U.S. conglomerates. That is, just as
U.S. conglomerates use internal capital markets to allocate funds according to each division’s
needs and corporate strategy, the equivalents in Korean chaebols distribute resources accord-
ing to each member’s needs and group strategy (Shin and Park, 1999). The presence of
internal capital markets, which are absent from Japanese keiretsu, allow researchers to
investigate more fully the e#ects of diversiﬁcation on ﬁrm value (Ferris et al., 2003) For
example, taking advantage of the similarities between Korean chaebols and U.S. conglomer-
ates, Ferris et al. (2003) used a sample of Korean ﬁrms between 1990 through 1995 and found
that ﬁrms that belong to the top 30 diversiﬁed chaebols (hereafter chaebol ﬁrms) su#er a value
loss relative to their non-chaebol counterparts. In addition, Ferris et al. identiﬁed the possible
causes of such value loss as the overinvestment in low-performing industries and cross-
subsidization of the weaker members of the groups — both of which are frequently mentioned
as the malfunctions of internal capital markets in diversiﬁed U.S. conglomerates.
In this study, consistent with Ferris et al. (2003), we conﬁrm that chaebol ﬁrms su#ered
value discount relative to non-chaebol ﬁrms before the Asian ﬁnancial crisis hit Korea in late
1997 and into 1998. Particularly, in the precrisis period, under the government-driven
development policy, chaebol ﬁrms strategically sought external growth and diversiﬁcation and,
thus, did not pursue the maximization of shareholder value. Also, chaebol ﬁrms expropriated
minority shareholders’ wealth by arbitrarily shifting values from one a$liate to another.
Further, they relied heavily on internal capital markets while practicing overinvestment and
cross-subsidization.
After the ﬁnancial crisis, however, various reforms resulted in signiﬁcant changes in the
Korean economy, which contributed to an increase in value of chaebol ﬁrms. For example, in
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the postcrisis period, corporate governance was improved and transparency was enhanced.
Internal capital markets were contracted, and arbitrary transactions among a$liates were
more closely monitored. In addition, more advanced disclosure practices were adopted and
shareholders’ rights were strengthened.
This study examines the e#ect of the changes that took place in the business practices of
both chaebol ﬁrms and the Korean economy after the ﬁnancial crisis. Particularly, we test the
hypothesis that the value discount found in Korean chaebols in the precrisis period disappears
under the reforms of the postcrisis period. Building on Ferris et al.’s (2003) study, which used
a sample of Korean ﬁrms during the precrisis period, we examine samples of both pre- and
postcrisis Korean ﬁrms to determine whether the costs of diversiﬁcation still dominate the
beneﬁts in the postcrisis period. In other words, by studying the group membership’s e#ect on
ﬁrm value in both the pre- and postcrisis periods, we investigate how the economic implications
of diversiﬁcation change as a country develops more market-driven business environments.
Our results show that, unlike in the precrisis period, the costs of group membership no longer
outweigh the beneﬁts in the postcrisis period, which suggests that the value discount of
business groups reported in prior studies is not an inevitable consequence of diversiﬁcation.
This study provides insight on the economic conditions necessary to alleviate the value
discount of diversiﬁcation and, thus, increase ﬁrm value through diversiﬁcation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature on diversiﬁc-
ation and ﬁrm value. Section 3 describes Korean chaebols and their reforms after the ﬁnancial
crisis. Section 4 discusses the data and empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
II . Diversiﬁcation and Firm Value
1. Beneﬁts and Costs of Diversiﬁcation
Compared with external capital markets, internal capital markets can reduce ine$ciencies
in resource allocation caused by information asymmetry (Gertner et al., 1994; Stein, 1997). In
fact, studies have shown that resource allocation is more e$cient when diversiﬁed ﬁrms use
internal markets (Chandler, 1977; Weston, 1970). This e$ciency is achieved by many means.
For example, by coordinating their specialized divisions, multidivisional ﬁrms can produce
greater proﬁts than if each line of business operates as a separate ﬁrm (Chandler, 1977).
Increased debt capacity and coinsurance are also beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation because they can
increase interest tax shields and, thus, add value to the ﬁrms involved (Lewellen, 1971). In
addition, Majd and Myers (1987) suggested that the tax code’s asymmetric treatment of gains
and losses also provides tax advantages to diversiﬁed conglomerates.
However, a number of studies have claimed that diversiﬁcation can create such costs as
overinvestment (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990), cross-subsidization of failing business segments
(Myer et al., 1992), and information asymmetry between central management and divisional
managers (Harris et al., 1982; Myerson, 1982). These studies suggest that diversiﬁed ﬁrms are
likely to invest more in negative net present value projects than their individual segments
would if operated independently (Jensen, 1986). Studies on internal capital markets also report
that internal capital markets could generate capital misallocation and, thus, ine$cient invest-
ments because ﬁrms often subsidize their poorly performing divisions, which impedes other
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divisions from ﬁnancing more proﬁtable investments (Lamont, 1997; Scharfstein and Stein,
2000; Shin and Stultz, 1998).
Because the empirical studies have produced mixed results, how the opposing beneﬁts and
costs of diversiﬁcation inﬂuence the overall value of a ﬁrm is not clear. For example, whereas
studies on U.S. ﬁrms during the 1960s reported the superior performance of diversiﬁed
conglomerates (Copeland and Weston, 1979; Matsusaka, 1993), studies completed between
the mid-1970s and mid-1980s showed no signiﬁcant relation between diversiﬁcation and
performance (De, 1992). In addition, more recent studies using data from the 1980s reported
a negative relation between diversiﬁcation and ﬁrm value (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Comment
and Jarrell, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Servaes, 1996). More recent studies have once again
pointed to the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation. For example, Campa and Kedia (2002), who take
into account the endogeniety of the diversiﬁcation decision, suggested that diversiﬁcation can
be a value-enhancing strategy. According to Campa and Kedia, an observed discount is not,
per se, evidence that diversiﬁcation destroys value; rather, they rather argue that the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc characteristics causing a ﬁrm to diversify might also cause it to be discounted. Other
studies of diversiﬁed business groups in emerging markets have reported that the beneﬁts of the
diversiﬁcation exceed the costs because the internal markets achieve useful ends, such as
market intermediation for products, ﬁnancing, and labor (Chang and Choi, 1988; Ghemawat
and Khanna, 1998; Khanna and Palepu, 1997, 2000).
2. Business Groups in Emerging Markets
In emerging markets with market imperfections, business groups are often considered
e$cient economic organizations because they minimize transaction costs through the use of
their internal markets. In a business environment in which economic infrastructures such as
external markets are underdeveloped, the internal markets in business groups can substitute
for, or complement, the imperfect external markets. Speciﬁcally, by distributing scarce
resources e$ciently among a$liated ﬁrms within the same business group or by decreasing
transaction costs between suppliers and purchasers using vertical integration, diversiﬁed
business groups can help their a$liated ﬁrms overcome the market imperfections (Chang and
Choi, 1988; Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998; Khanna and Palepu, 1997, 2000; Le#, 1978).
Nonetheless, the costs of diversiﬁcation reported in U.S. conglomerates can also be found in
the business groups in emerging markets. In other words, like diversiﬁed U.S. ﬁrms, business
groups in emerging markets have the potential either to o#er beneﬁts to member ﬁrms or to
destroy their value (Khanna and Palepu, 2000).
Khanna and Palepu (2000) analyzed the performance of a$liates of diversiﬁed Indian
business groups relative to that of una$liated ﬁrms. They found that accounting and stock
market measures of ﬁrm performance initially decrease with group diversiﬁcation but subse-
quently increase once the group diversiﬁcation exceeds a certain threshold, suggesting that the
most diversiﬁed Indian business groups increase their value by replicating the functions of the
institutions that are missing in emerging markets. Similarly, Fauver et al. (2002), using a
sample from 35 countries, examined whether the value of corporate diversiﬁcation is related to
the level of capital market development and found no value discount of diversiﬁcation in
countries with underdeveloped capital markets but a signiﬁcant value discount of diversiﬁc-
ation in countries with advanced capital markets. Even though they did not ﬁnd a value
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [December+0,
premium of diversiﬁcation in countries with underdeveloped capital markets, their results
suggest that the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation can o#set the costs in emerging markets with market
imperfection.
However, Lins and Servaes (2002) found that diversiﬁed ﬁrms in seven emerging markets
(Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand in 1995)
traded at a discount of approximately 7% compared with single-segment ﬁrms and were also
less proﬁtable than their counterparts. Further, they found that such discount is more
substantial in ﬁrms that are members of industrial groups, supporting the argument that the
industrial group structure allows for the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling
shareholders. Consistent with Lins and Servaes, Ferris et al. (2003), using a sample of ﬁrms
from 1990 to 1995, reported that group-a$liated ﬁrms in Korea su#er value loss relative to
nona$liated counterparts. They identify the possible causes of such value loss as overinvest-
ment in low performing industries and cross-subsidization for the weaker members of the
groups — both of which are frequently mentioned as the primary malfunctions of internal
capital markets in diversiﬁed conglomerates. Thus, their ﬁnding suggests that the value
discount of diversiﬁcation is not restricted to multisegment ﬁrms but is also present in
diversiﬁed business groups (Ferris et al., 2003).
Although Japan is not usually classiﬁed as an emerging market, studies on Japanese
keiretsu have also produced mixed results. For example, Hoshi et al. (1990, 1991), Prowse
(1992), and Ferris et al. (1995) reported beneﬁts of keiretsu a$liation, such as the reductions
in agency costs, bankruptcy costs, monitoring costs, and liquidity constraints. In contrast,
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), Morck and Nakamura (1999), and Kang and Stulz (2000)
reported signiﬁcant costs to group membership caused by the presence of an a$liated bank.
Further, Lins and Servaes (1999) found that keiretsu ﬁrms experience a value loss (but they
do not identify whether this ﬁnding results from a main bank or a conglomeration e#ect) etc.
III . Korean Chaebols and the Asian Financial Crisis
Immediately following the Korea War, the Korean economy lacked various components
of a sound business infrastructure, including e$cient external capital markets, reliable suppli-
ers, and competent managers. This situation forced Korean chaebols to make the most of their
own internal markets (Sakong and Jones, 1980). Particularly, because the external capital
markets in Korea were underdeveloped, chaebols formed pools of funds generated from
a$liated companies and used them to ﬁnance new business ventures or rescue poorly
performing a$liates, thus creating internal capital markets within the groups (Chang and
Hong, 2000). Like other business groups that are ubiquitous in most emerging markets,
chaebols take the form of pyramidal structures, where a small number of controlling
shareholders or founding families exercise excessive voting rights relative to their cash ﬂow
rights.1 Thus, controlling shareholders could often move capital across member ﬁrms within
1 For instance, as of 2004, the largest shareholder of SK Co., the main a$liate of SK group which is one of the
top ﬁve chaebols in Korea, is Sovereign Investment with 14.99% of shares. This ﬁgure is greater than the
ownership of chairman Choi, who is a member of the founding family. However, chairman Choi can actually
exercise up to 17.5% voting rights through relatives’ shares and other a$liates’ shares, which puts him in a
position of e#ective ownership.
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a group with minimal external monitoring (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999)
to the detriment of minority shareholders’ wealth. The recent economic crises in Asia and
other emerging markets have also highlighted the concern that business groups are di$cult to
monitor because their disclosures are inadequate, particularly regarding the related party
transactions among group ﬁrms.
However, in the period following the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, under the course of Interna-
tional Monetary Fund-driven market reforms, Korean chaebols changed. Because the old
business practices and corporate governance of chaebol ﬁrms were considered major causes of
the ﬁnancial crisis, certain reforms were targeted at chaebol ﬁrms in an attempt to correct their
internal capital markets and improve their corporate transparency. For example, in April 1998,
the government prohibited new cross-loan guarantees among a$liated companies in chaebols
and also legislated chaebol ﬁrms to dissolve all existing cross-loan guarantees by March 2003,
e#ectively contracting the function of internal capital markets in chaebols (Kim, 2000; Yoo,
2000). Further, the government’s tacit pressure for chaebol ﬁrms to lower their debt-to-equity
ratio to less than 200% prompted targeted ﬁrms to issue equities to meet the ratio, ﬁnally
establishing the dependence of chaebol ﬁrms on the external stock market (Kim, 2000; Yoo,
2000). Under these postcrisis circumstances, chaebol ﬁrms were motivated to mitigate infor-
mation asymmetry to receive more readily facile ﬁnancing in external capital markets (Chang
et al., 2005). In addition, combined ﬁnancial statements were also adopted in 1999 to prevent
arbitrary transactions among a$liated companies, thus improving the transparency of chaebol
ﬁrms (Kim, 2000; Yoo, 2000).
In line with these reforms directly targeted at chaebols, other reforms in the ﬁnancial
sector also inﬂuenced chaebols to change their business practices in the postcrisis period. For
example, during the precrisis period, commercial banks in Korea were controlled by the
government, and the ﬁnancial resources of the banks were distributed according to the policy
of the government, rather than any market mechanism. Thus, chaebol ﬁrms, who enjoyed
privileges under government-driven development policies, could easily ﬁnance their businesses
using bank loans. In addition, because resource distribution was also based on outward ﬁrm
size, chaebol ﬁrms — without consideration of proﬁtability or shareholder value — pursued
external growth by using debt, inﬂating assets, and through diversiﬁcation.
However, after the ﬁnancial crisis, business practices in the ﬁnancial sector became more
aligned with global standards, and government policy was replaced by market mechanisms in
distributing resources in the ﬁnancial sector.2 As governmental ﬁnancial support for chaebol
ﬁrms of the past was no longer available after the ﬁnancial crisis, the myth among Koreans
that “a chaebol never collapses” was dispelled. As chaebols began to fall apart or their member
ﬁrms faced bankruptcy, the surviving chaebols, who recognized the loss of their safety net,
ﬁnally began to pursue the maximization of ﬁrm value rather than focusing solely on external
2 After the ﬁnancial crisis, commercial banks in Korea whose Bank for International Settlement (BIS) ratio was
below 2% were given management improvement orders from the government, such as the complete write-o# of
equity capital, suspension of operation, merger with healthier ﬁnancial institutions designated by the Financial
Supervisory Service, and so on. In addition, the government also ordered that ﬁnancial institutions have outside
directors for more than half of their board members and also have audit committees and compliance o$cers to
observe whether the institutions obey the law. Consequently, the soundness and proﬁtability of ﬁnancial institu-
tions were enhanced in the postcrisis period, and the average BIS ratio of commercial banks increased from
around 7.0% at the end of 1998 to 10.5% at the end of 2002 (Kim 2003).
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growth.
Changes in the corporate sector also took place that a#ected chaebols. Particularly, the
restructuring drive in the postcrisis period inﬂuenced chaebol ﬁrms to promote a shareholder-
oriented management paradigm, and, consequently, shareholder activism increased in large
ﬁrms. Shareholders began to voice their opinions more readily on matters of corporate
management, and investors’ rights received more protection. For example, the often-neglected
property rights of minority shareholders and foreign investors were strengthened and rights
such as the examination of ﬁnancial accounts became easier for minority shareholders to
exercise. Also, collective lawsuits against external auditors were permitted, and the govern-
mental supervision of external auditing was reinforced.
In addition, the transparency of Korean ﬁrms was improved in the postcrisis period. The
government forced all companies listed on the Korean Stock Exchange to have as much as
one-fourth of their boards comprised of outside directors. Further, the boards of large
companies (with assets worth over 2 trillion Korean won) were required to ﬁll more than half
their board with outside directors. Also, a more advanced disclosure system was implemented
to increase companies’ responsibility for their public announcements. (Chang et al., 2005). In
addition, Chang and Shin (2003) reported that after the ﬁnancial crisis chief executive o$cer
turnover sensitivity to performance in chaebol ﬁrms exceeded performance sensitivity in
stand-alone ﬁrms, indicating that the monitoring of chief executive o$cers in chaebol ﬁrms
improved more than in non-chaebol ﬁrms. These improvements in the transparency and
monitoring of chaebol ﬁrms likely contributed to subsequent improvements in e$ciency and
ﬁrm value during the postcrisis period.
In this study, we expand on Ferris et al. (2003). Consistent with Ferris et al., we suppose
that chaebol ﬁrms su#er value discount relative to non-chaebol ﬁrms in the precrisis period
because chaebol ﬁrms, beneﬁting from government-driven development policy, strategically
pursued external growth and diversiﬁcation to the detriment of maximizing shareholder value.
However, after the ﬁnancial crisis, chaebols’ business practices changed. Therefore, we
hypothesize that the value discount found in Korean chaebols in the precrisis period disappears
under the changed business practices of the postcrisis period. If our hypothesis holds, our
ﬁndings will indicate that in the Korean market the costs of business group membership no
longer outweigh the beneﬁts and, hence, suggest that diversiﬁcation is not in itself a negative
factor in determining ﬁrm value.
IV . Data and Empirical Results
1. Data
Our sample is comprised of companies listed on the Korean Stock Exchange in the
precrisis period (1993-1996) and the postcrisis period (1999-2002). We exclude the years of
the Korean ﬁnancial crisis (1997-1998). In addition, because we want to compare chaebol and
non-chaebol ﬁrms, we further exclude the companies that are not deﬁned as either chaebol
ﬁrms or non-chaebol ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, for the purposes of this study, chaebol ﬁrms are
deﬁned as companies whose a$liated business groups are ranked in the top 30 on the basis of
total assets (the sum of the total assets of all a$liated companies, each of which is a member
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of the same business group), and non-chaebol ﬁrms are deﬁned as companies whose a$liated
business groups are ranked below the top 50 on the basis of total assets or as stand-alone
companies that do not belong to any business group. We exclude the ﬁrms belonging to
chaebols ranked between the top 31 and 50 because these middle-size business groups share
characteristics of both larger chaebol ﬁrms and independent stand-alone ﬁrms. Finally, we
exclude companies belonging to any industry-year sample that has less than ﬁve non-chaebol
ﬁrms, ﬁnancial institutions, and utility companies controlled by the government. We use the
KISLINE database provided by the Korean Credit Evaluation Information Co. and the TS
2000 database serviced by the Committee of Listed Companies to collect ﬁnancial information,
stock prices, and chaebol a$liation information for each company in the sample.
2. Univariate Analyses
Three measures are used to estimate ﬁrm value: Tobin’s q, excess value by assets, and
excess value by earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). By deﬁnition, Tobin’s q is the
present value of future cash ﬂows divided by the replacement cost of tangible assets. Because
no risk adjustment or normalization is required to compare q across ﬁrms, we can easily use
this measure to compare ﬁrm value (Lang and Stulz, 1994). Following Khanna and Palepu
(2000), we use the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for Tobin’s q; market-to-book ratio is equal
to the sum of the market value of the common stock, the book value of the preferred stock, and
the book value of any debt, divided by the book value of the total assets. We deﬁne the market
value of the common stock as the closing price of the common stock at the ﬁscal year-end
multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding.3
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all variables.4 For the whole period (Panel A),
the mean (median) of Tobin’s q is 1.0877 (0.9990) for non-chaebol ﬁrms and 1.0196 (0.9827)
for chaebol ﬁrms; for the precrisis period (Panel B), 1.1592 (1.0821) for non-chaebol ﬁrms
and 1.0398 (1.0156) for chaebol ﬁrms; and for the postcrisis period (Panel C), 1.0239 (0.9021)
for non-chaebol ﬁrms and 0.9914 (0.9188) for chaebol ﬁrms. Consistent with Ferris et al.
(2003), the di#erences in the mean and median between the two groups are statistically
signiﬁcant in the precrisis period, implying that chaebol ﬁrms su#er value discount relative to
non-chaebol ﬁrms during this period. However, the di#erences in the mean and median are not
statistically signiﬁcant in the postcrisis period, which is inconsistent with Ferris et al. (2003).
This result does not provide evidence that chaebol ﬁrms continue to su#er value discount in the
postcrisis period. Using multiple regression analyses that control for other factors possibly
a#ecting Tobin’s q, in the following section we address whether the value discount in chaebol
ﬁrms actually disappears in the postcrisis period.
Similar to Berger and Ofek (1995) and Ferris et al. (2003), we construct excess value by
assets, another measure of ﬁrm value, using an industry assets multiplier. Excess value by
3 For consistent comparisons between the pre- and postcrisis periods, we subtract revaluation reserve from the
total assets for the postcrisis period when estimating the proxy for Tobin’s q because many ﬁrms in Korea
increased their book value by reevaluating their assets right after the crisis, mainly to meet the government’s
radical demand for lowering debt-to-equity ratio.
4 To minimize the e#ect of outliers, tobin’s q, excess value by assets, excess value by EBIT, EBIT/sales, Capex/
sales, and debt/assets lying in either the top 1% or bottom 1% of its distributions in the whole sample period are
given as missing values.
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assets is, in itself, industry-year adjusted and does not require assumptions about the ﬁrm’s
replacement value, as does the calculation for Tobin’s q (Berger and Ofek, 1995). Excess value
by assets is calculated as the natural log of the ratio of the ﬁrm’s actual value (i.e., the sum of
the market value of the common stock, the book value of the preferred stock, and the book
value of any debt) to its imputed value using an assets multiplier. This imputed value is
calculated as the ﬁrm’s total assets times the industry-year median capital-to-assets ratio (i.e.,
actual value divided by assets). To make a direct comparison between chaebol and non-
chaebol ﬁrms, the industry-year median capital-to-assets ratio is drawn only from the sample
of non-chaebol ﬁrms (Berger and Ofek 1995; Ferris et al., 2003).
For the whole period, the mean (median) of excess value by assets is -0.0109 (-0.0308) for
non-chaebol ﬁrms and -0.0611 (-0.0774) for chaebol ﬁrms (Table 1, Panel A); for the precrisis
period, 0.0288 (0.0000) for non-chaebol ﬁrms and -0.0590 (-0.0709) for chaebol ﬁrms (Panel
B); and for the postcrisis period,-0.0462 (-0.0969) for non-chaebol ﬁrms and -0.0640 (-0.0970)
for chaebol ﬁrms (Panel C). The di#erences in the mean and median are statistically signiﬁcant
for both the whole period and the precrisis period, consistent with Ferris et al. (2003). This
result suggests that chaebol ﬁrms su#er value discount relative to non-chaebol ﬁrms in the
precrisis period. However, the di#erences in the mean and median are not statistically
signiﬁcant for the postcrisis period, which is inconsistent with Ferris et al. (2003) and does not
provide evidence that the value discount in chaebol ﬁrms still exists after the ﬁnancial crisis.
Similar to Berger and Ofek (1995) and Ferris et al. (2003), we construct excess value by
EBIT using the industry EBIT multiplier. Even though the earnings number is more vulner-
able to manipulation and, thus, less reliable than assets, the earnings multiplier has the
advantage of imputing value directly from current proﬁtability, which may be more directly
linked to ﬁrm value than assets are (Berger and Ofek, 1995). Speciﬁcally, excess value by EBIT
is calculated as the natural log of the ratio of the ﬁrm’s actual value (i.e., the sum of the market
value of the common stock, the book value of the preferred stock, and the book value of any
debt) to its imputed value using the EBIT multiplier. This imputed value is calculated as the
ﬁrm’s operating income times the industry-year median capital-to-operating income ratio (i.e.,
actual value divided by operating income). To make a direct comparison between chaebol and
non-chaebol ﬁrms, the industry-year median capital-to-operating income ratio is drawn
exclusively from the sample of non-chaebol ﬁrms, which is consistent with Berger and Ofek
and Ferris et al. When a ﬁrm has negative operating income, the variable is given as missing
value.
For the whole period, the mean (median) of excess value by EBIT is 0.3002 (0.0996) for
non-chaebol ﬁrms and 0.2318 (0.0889) for chaebol ﬁrms (Table 1, Panel A); for the precrisis
period, 0.2074 (0.0465) for non-chaebol ﬁrms and 0.1087 (-0.0423) for chaebol ﬁrms (Panel
B); and for the postcrisis period, 0.3951 (0.1893) for non-chaebol ﬁrms and 0.4151 (0.2223)
for chaebol ﬁrms (Panel C). The di#erences in the mean and median are statistically signiﬁcant
for the precrisis period, consistent with Ferris et al. (2003). This result suggests that chaebol
ﬁrms su#er value discount relative to non-chaebol ﬁrms in the precrisis period. However, the
di#erences in the mean and median are not statistically signiﬁcant for the postcrisis period,
which is inconsistent with Ferris et al. (2003) and does not provide evidence that the value
discount in chaebol ﬁrms still exists after the ﬁnancial crisis. Using multiple regression analyses
that control for other factors possibly a#ecting excess value by assets or by EBIT, in the
following section we address whether the value discount in chaebol ﬁrms actually disappears
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in the postcrisis period.
Log(assets) is a proxy for ﬁrm size. Table 1, Panel A shows that the mean (median) of
log(assets) for the whole period is 18.5051 (18.4661) for non-chaebol ﬁrms and 20.4705
(20.5297) for chaebol ﬁrms. The di#erences in the mean and median between the two groups
are statistically signiﬁcant, implying that chaebol ﬁrms are, on average, larger than non-
chaebol ﬁrms. Panel B and Panel C show similar results for the precrisis and postcrisis periods.
Firm age is measured by a di#erence between current year and the ﬁrm’s establishment year.
Panel A shows that the mean (median) of ﬁrm age for the whole period is 30.3372 (29.0000)
for non-chaebol ﬁrms and 33.2770 (32.0000) for chaebol ﬁrms. The di#erences in the mean
and median between the two groups are statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that chaebol ﬁrms
are, on average, older than non-chaebol ﬁrms. Panel B and Panel C also show similar results
for the precrisis and postcrisis periods.
EBIT/sales is a proxy of ﬁrm proﬁtability and is measured by dividing operating income
by sales. Table 1, Panel A shows that the mean (median) of EBIT/sales is 0.0474 (0.0560) for
non-chaebol ﬁrms and 0.0605 (0.0673) for chaebol ﬁrms. The di#erences in the mean and
median between the two groups are statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that chaebol ﬁrms are,
on average, more proﬁtable than non-chaebol ﬁrms in the whole period. Panel B shows that
only the median has a weakly signiﬁcant di#erence, but Panel C shows that both the mean and
median have strongly signiﬁcant di#erences.
The ratio of capital expenditures (capex) to sales is a proxy for a ﬁrm’s growth
opportunities and is measured by dividing capital expenditures by sales. Table 1, Panel A
shows that the mean (median) of capex/sales is 0.0383 (0.0246) for non-chaebol ﬁrms and
0.0529 (0.0319) for chaebol ﬁrms. The di#erences in the mean and median between the two
groups are statistically signiﬁcant, implying that chaebol ﬁrms have, on average, more growth
opportunities than non-chaebol ﬁrms in the whole period. Panel B shows similar results, but
Panel C shows that only the mean has a weakly signiﬁcant di#erence.
Debt/assets is a measure of leverage and is measured by dividing total debt by total assets.
Table 1, Panel A shows that the mean (median) of debt/assets is 0.6386 (0.6018) and 0.7291
(0.7213) for chaebol ﬁrms. The di#erences in the mean and median between the two groups
are statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that chaebol ﬁrms have, on average, higher leverage
than non-chaebol ﬁrms in the whole period. Panel B and Panel C show similar results.
Table 1, Panel D shows the di#erence of each variable between the pre- and postcrisis
periods. For both non-chaebol and chaebol ﬁrms, Tobin’s q and excess value by assets in the
postcrisis period are smaller than those in the precrisis period, but excess value by EBIT is
greater in the postcrisis period than it is in precrisis period. Also, after the ﬁnancial crisis, log
(assets) and ﬁrm age, on average, increased, but EBIT/sales, capex/sales, and debt/assets
decreased.
Table 2 demonstrates the Pearson correlations among the variables. Panel A shows the
results of a correlation analysis using sample ﬁrms in the precrisis period. Tobin’s q has a
signiﬁcantly positive correlation with excess value by assets, excess value by EBIT, and debt/
assets and a signiﬁcantly negative correlation with log(assets), ﬁrm age, capex/sales, and
chaebol dummy. Excess value by assets has a signiﬁcantly positive correlation with excess
value by EBIT and debt/assets and a signiﬁcantly negative correlation with log(assets), ﬁrm
age, capex/sales, and chaebol dummy. Excess value by EBIT has a signiﬁcantly negative
correlation with log(assets), EBIT/sales, and chaebol dummy.
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Panel B of Table 2 shows the results of a correlation analysis using sample ﬁrms in the
postcrisis period. Tobin’s q has a signiﬁcantly positive correlation with excess value by assets,
excess value by EBIT, and debt/assets and a signiﬁcantly negative correlation with log(assets),
ﬁrm age, EBIT/sales, and capex/sales. Excess value by assets has a signiﬁcantly positive
correlation with excess value by EBIT, and debt/assets and a signiﬁcantly negative correlation
with log(assets), ﬁrm age, EBIT/sales, and capex/sales. Excess value by EBIT has a sig-
niﬁcantly positive correlation with debt/assets and a signiﬁcantly negative correlation with
EBIT/sales.
3. Multivariate Analyses
In multivariate analyses, we deﬁne the new variable, postcrisis dummy, which takes the
value of 1 in the case of post crisis period and, zero otherwise. In addition, we also deﬁne the
variable chaebol*postcrisis dummy, which is the product of chaebol dummy and postcrisis
dummy and, thus, represents the interaction between the two variables.
Table 3 shows the results of the regression of Tobin’s q. Consistent with Khanna and
Palepu (2000), we construct the regression model of Tobin’s q as follows.
Model 1: Tobin’s qab1Chaebol Dummyb4Residual of Log(Assets)b5Firm Age
Industry Dummiese
Model 2: TTobin’s q a  b1Chaebol Dummy  b2Chaebol * Postcrisis Dummy 
b3Postcrisis Dummyb4Residual of Log(Assets)b5Firm AgeIndustry
Dummiese
To control for ﬁrm size in these regression models, we use residual of log(assets), which
is the residual of the regression of log(assets) on chaebol dummy, so that the e#ect of chaebol
dummy on Tobin’s q may be clearly separated from that of log(assets). As shown in Table 2,
the correlation coe$cient between chaebol dummy and log(assets) is about 60%. Because
chaebol ﬁrms in Korea are mostly large ﬁrms, it exacerbates the problem of multicollinearity
to use both chaebol dummy and log(assets) as independent variables concurrently in a
regression equation. Thus, we attempt to mitigate this problem by using residual of log(assets),
which is orthogonal to chaebol dummy, instead of log(assets) to provide a purer measure of
the e#ect of ﬁrm size on ﬁrm value, net of any chaebol a$liation e#ect.
In Panel A of Table 3, Model 1 shows that chaebol dummy is signiﬁcantly negatively
associated with Tobin’s q for the whole sample period, which indicates that chaebol ﬁrms su#er
value discount relative to non-chaebol ﬁrms during the whole period. This result is consistent
with Berger and Ofek (1995) and Ferris et al. (2003), who reported that diversiﬁed or
group-a$liated ﬁrms su#er value discount. Model 2 shows the same result for chaebol dummy
during the whole period. However, Model 2 also shows that chaebol*postcrisis dummy is
signiﬁcantly positively associated with Tobin’s q. This result provides evidence that chaebol
ﬁrms experience an improvement in ﬁrm value in the postcrisis period relative to non-chaebol
ﬁrms.5 Postcrisis dummy in Model 2 is signiﬁcantly negatively associated with Tobin’s q,
5 However, additional tests show that the sum of the two coe$cients, chaebol dummy and chaebol*postcrisis
dummy, is 10% signiﬁcantly di#erent from zero. Thus, we cannot directly conclude from Table 3 that the value
discount of chaebol ﬁrms in the precrisis period clearly disappears in the postcrisis period.
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suggesting that Korean ﬁrms generally experienced a decrease in Tobin’s q after the ﬁnancial
crisis but that chaebol ﬁrms were less inﬂuenced by this general negative trend. Residual of log
(assets) is signiﬁcantly negatively associated with Tobin’s q in both Model 1 and Model 2,
implying that the larger the ﬁrm size is, the smaller is the ﬁrm value. Firm age is also negatively
associated with Tobin’s q in both models, suggesting that the older the ﬁrm is, the smaller the
ﬁrm value is.
In Panel B and Panel C of Table 2, we run the same regression but use the subperiod
samples. Panel B shows that in each year in the precrisis period chaebol dummy has a
signiﬁcantly negative association with Tobin’s q. Further, when aggregating the 4-year
precrisis sample, chaebol dummy also has a signiﬁcantly negative association with Tobin’s q.
These results are consistent with Ferris et al. (2003), who report that chaebol ﬁrms su#er value
loss in the 1990 through 1995 sample period. However, Panel C shows that in each year except
year 2000 in the postcrisis period chaebol dummy does not have a signiﬁcantly negative
association with Tobin’s q. Even though this ﬁnding is not direct evidence that the value
discount in chaebol ﬁrms disappeared after the ﬁnancial crisis, it illustrates changes in the ﬁrm
value of chaebols in each year in the postcrisis period and helps explain the results in Table 3,
Panel A.
Table 4 shows the results of the regression of excess value by assets. Consistent with
Berger and Ofek (1995), the regression model of excess value by assets is constructed as
follows.
Model 1: Excess Value by Assetsab1Chaebol Dummyb4Residual of Log(Assets)
b5EBIT/Salesb6Capex/Salese
Model 2: Excess Value by Assetsab1Chaebol Dummyb2Chaebol*Postcrisis
Dummyb3Postcrisis Dummyb4Residual of Log(Assets)b5EBIT/Sales
b6Capex/Salese
Following Berger and Ofek (1995), in this regression we control for the ﬁrm size,
proﬁtability, and growth opportunity as factors that may a#ect the excess value by assets.
Residual of log(assets), EBIT/sales, and capex/sales are used as proxies for the ﬁrm size,
proﬁtability, and growth opportunity, respectively.
In Table 4, Panel A, Model 1 shows that chaebol dummy is signiﬁcantly negatively
associated with excess value by assets in the whole sample period. This result is consistent with
Berger and Ofek (1995) and Ferris et al. (2003), who reported that diversiﬁed or group-
a$liated ﬁrms su#er value discount. Model 2 shows the same result for chaebol dummy for the
whole period. However, Model 2 also shows that chaebol*postcrisis dummy is signiﬁcantly
positively associated with excess value by assets, which provides evidence that in the postcrisis
period chaebol ﬁrms experience an improvement in ﬁrm value relative to non-chaebol ﬁrms.
Also, additional testing (not reported in the table) shows that the sum of the two coe$cients,
chaebol dummy and chaebol*postcrisis dummy, is not signiﬁcantly di#erent from zero,
indicating that the value discount of chaebol ﬁrms in the precrisis period clearly disappears in
the postcrisis period. Postcrisis dummy in Model 2 is signiﬁcantly negatively associated with
excess value by assets, suggesting that Korean ﬁrms generally experienced a decrease in excess
value by assets after the ﬁnancial crisis but that chaebol ﬁrms in particular were less inﬂuenced
by this general negative trend. Residual of log(assets) is signiﬁcantly negative in both Model
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1 and Model 2, implying that the larger the ﬁrm size is, the smaller the ﬁrm value is. Both
EBIT/sales and capex/sales are signiﬁcantly negatively associated with excess value by assets
in both models.
We run the same regression but use the subperiod samples. Panel B shows that, in each
year in the precrisis period, chaebol dummy has a signiﬁcantly negative association with excess
value by assets. In addition, when aggregating the 4-year precrisis sample, chaebol dummy also
has a signiﬁcantly negative association with excess value by asset. However, Panel C shows
that in each year in the postcrisis period chaebol dummy does not have a signiﬁcantly negative
association with excess value by assets. In fact, in 2002, chaebol dummy has a 10%
signiﬁcantly positive association with excess value by assets. In addition, when aggregating the
4-year postcrisis sample, chaebol dummy does not have a signiﬁcant association with excess
value by assets. Although this ﬁnding is not direct evidence that the value discount of chaebol
ﬁrms disappeared after the ﬁnancial crisis, it illustrates changes in the ﬁrm value for chaebols
in each year in the postcrisis period and also explains the results in Panel A.
Table 5 shows the results of the regression of excess value by EBIT. Consistent with the
regression of excess value by assets, the regression model of excess value by EBIT is
constructed as follows.
Model 1: Excess Value by EBITab1Chaebol Dummyb4Residual of Log(Assets)
b5EBIT/Salesb6Capex/Salese
Model 2: Excess Value by EBITab1Chaebol Dummyb2Chaebol*Postcrisis Dummy
 b3Postcrisis Dummy b4Residual of Log (Assets) b5EBIT / Sales
b6Capex/Salese
The results in Table 5 also support our hypothesis. In Panel A, Model 1 shows that
chaebol dummy is signiﬁcantly negatively associated with excess value by EBIT in the whole
sample period, which implies that chaebol ﬁrms su#er value discount relative to non-chaebol
ﬁrms during the whole period. Model 2 shows the same result for chaebol dummy during the
whole period. However, Model 2 also shows that chaebol*postcrisis dummy is signiﬁcantly
positively associated with excess value by EBIT, which provides evidence that in the postcrisis
period chaebol ﬁrms experience an improvement in ﬁrm value relative to non-chaebol ﬁrms.
Also, additional testing (not reported in the table) shows that the sum of the two coe$cients,
chaebol dummy and chaebol*postcrisis dummy, is not signiﬁcantly di#erent from zero,
indicating that the value discount of chaebol ﬁrms in the precrisis period clearly disappears in
the postcrisis period. Postcrisis dummy in Model 2 in Table 5, Panel A (unlike the same
variable in Table 4) is signiﬁcantly positively associated with excess value by EBIT, suggesting
that Korean ﬁrms generally experience an increase in excess value by EBIT after the ﬁnancial
crisis. Residual of log(assets) is not signiﬁcant in Model 1 and Model 2. EBIT/sales is
signiﬁcantly negative in both models. Capex/sales is not signiﬁcant in Model 1 but is
signiﬁcantly positive in Model 2.
In Panels B and C of Table 5 we run the same regression using the subperiod samples.
Panel B shows that in each year except 1993 in the precrisis period chaebol dummy has a
signiﬁcantly negative association with excess value by EBIT. In addition, when aggregating the
4-year precrisis sample, chaebol dummy also has a signiﬁcantly negative association with
excess value by EBIT. However, Panel C shows that in each year in the postcrisis period
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chaebol dummy does not have a signiﬁcantly negative association with excess value by EBIT.
In fact, in 1999, chaebol dummy has a 10% signiﬁcantly positive association with excess value
by EBIT. In addition, when aggregating the 4-year postcrisis sample, chaebol dummy does not
have a signiﬁcant association with excess value by EBIT.
4. Robustness Tests
Building on the results in Table 4, Table 6 shows the results of the regression of excess
value by assets. However, in Table 6, we follow Ferris et al. (2003) by including debt/assets
ratio in the regression model as an additional control variable. The regression model in Table
6 is constructed as follows.
Model 1: Excess Value by Assetsab1Chaebol Dummyb4Residual of Log(Assets)
b5EBIT/Salesb6Capex/Salesb7Debt/Assetse
Model 2: Excess Value by Assetsab1Chaebol Dummyb2Chaebol*Postcrisis
Dummyb3Postcrisis Dummyb4Residual of Log(Assets)b5EBIT/Sales
b6Capex/Salesb7Debt/Assetse
In Table 6, Panel A, both Model 1 and Model 2 show that chaebol dummy is signiﬁcantly
negatively associated with excess value by assets in the whole sample period, which indicates
that chaebol ﬁrms su#er value discount relative to non-chaebol ﬁrms during the whole period.
However, Model 2 also shows that chaebol*postcrisis dummy is signiﬁcantly positively
associated with excess value by assets. This result provides evidence that in the postcrisis
period chaebol ﬁrms experience an improvement in ﬁrm value relative to non-chaebol ﬁrms.6
Postcrisis dummy in Model 2 is signiﬁcantly negatively associated with excess value by assets.
This result suggests that Korean ﬁrms generally experienced a decrease in excess value by
assets after the ﬁnancial crisis but that chaebol ﬁrms were less inﬂuenced by this general
negative trend. Residual of log(assets) is signiﬁcantly negative in Model 1 and Model 2. EBIT/
sales, capex/sales, and debt/assets are all signiﬁcantly positive in both models.
In Panels B and C of Table 6 we run the same regression using the subperiod samples.
Panel B shows that in each year in the precrisis period chaebol dummy has a signiﬁcantly
negative association with excess value by assets. In addition, when aggregating the 4-year
precrisis sample, chaebol dummy also has a signiﬁcantly negative association with excess value
by assets, which is consistent with Ferris et al. (2003). However, Panel C shows somewhat
mixed results. Chaebol dummy has a signiﬁcantly negative value in 1999 and 2000 but not in
2001 and 2002. When aggregating the 4-year postcrisis sample, unlike earlier results, chaebol
dummy is signiﬁcantly negative.
Building on the results in Table 5, Table 7 shows the results of regression of excess value
by EBIT, including debt/assets as an additional control variable (Ferris et al., 2003). The
regression model in Table 7 is constructed as follows.
Model 1: Excess Value by EBITab1Chaebol Dummyb4Residual of Log(Assets)
6 However, because the sum of the two coe$cients, chaebol dummy and chaebol*postcrisis dummy, is sig-
niﬁcantly di#erent from zero, we cannot directly conclude from Table 6, where debt/assets ratio is included in the
regression, that the value discount of chaebol ﬁrms in the precrisis period clearly disappears in the postcrisis
period.
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Model 2: Excess Value by EBITab1Chaebol Dummyb2Chaebol*Postcrisis Dummy
 b3Postcrisis Dummy b4Residual of Log (Assets) b5EBIT / Sales
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The results in Table 7 support our hypothesis. In Panel A, both Model 1 and Model 2
show that chaebol dummy is signiﬁcantly negatively associated with excess value by EBIT in
the whole sample period, which indicates that chaebol ﬁrms su#er value discount relative to
non-chaebol ﬁrms during the whole period. However, Model 2 also shows that chaebol*
postcrisis dummy is signiﬁcantly positively associated with excess value by assets, providing
evidence that in the postcrisis period chaebol ﬁrms experience an improvement in ﬁrm value
relative to non-chaebol ﬁrms. Also, additional testing (not reported in the table) shows that the
sum of the two coe$cients, chaebol dummy and chaebol*postcrisis dummy, is not signiﬁcantly
di#erent from zero, indicating that the value discount of chaebol ﬁrms in the precrisis period
clearly disappears in the postcrisis period. In addition, postcrisis dummy in Model 2 is
signiﬁcantly positively associated with excess value by EBIT, suggesting that Korean ﬁrms
generally experience an increase in excess value by EBIT after the ﬁnancial crisis. Residual of
log(assets) is not signiﬁcant in Model 1 but is signiﬁcantly negative in Model 2. In both
models, EBIT/sales is signiﬁcantly negative and capex/sales and debt/assets are signiﬁcantly
positive.
In Panels B and C of Table 7 we run the same regression using the subperiod samples.
Panel B shows that in each year except 1993 in the precrisis period chaebol dummy has a
signiﬁcantly negative association with excess value by EBIT. In addition, when aggregating the
4-year precrisis sample, chaebol dummy also has a signiﬁcantly negative association with
excess value by EBIT, which is consistent with Ferris et al. (2003), who report that chaebol
ﬁrms su#er value loss using a 1990 through 1995 sample period. However, Panel C shows that
in each year except 2000 in the postcrisis period chaebol dummy does not have a signiﬁcant
association with excess value by EBIT. In addition, when aggregating the 4-year postcrisis
sample, chaebol dummy does not have a signiﬁcant association with excess value by EBIT.
V . Conclusion
Unlike a diversiﬁed U.S. conglomerate with multiple divisions operating in various
industries within a ﬁrm, a Korean chaebol is a group of independent business entities operating
in various industries but acting like a single ﬁrm in many cases, including investment decisions.
Thus, studies on Korean chaebols provide more accurate valuations of each industry unit and,
hence, can measure more accurately the e#ect of diversiﬁcation on ﬁrm value as compared
with studies on U.S. conglomerates. Also, unlike a Japanese keiretsu, which has a main bank
in the center of the group, studies on Korean chaebols — which are prohibited from having a
bank as a ﬁrm member — make it possible to estimate the e#ect of diversiﬁcation without the
confounding e#ect of a main bank.
Although prior studies on diversiﬁed conglomerates in the U.S. market and on business
groups in emerging markets have produced mixed results regarding the e#ect of diversiﬁcation
on ﬁrm value, Ferris et al. (2003), using a sample of Korean ﬁrms during 1990 through 1995,
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [December+2*
T
6
7A
:
7
.
R
:<
G
:H
H>
D
C
R
:H
J
AI
H
D
;
E
M
8
:H
H
V
6
AJ
:
7N
E
B
IT
O
C
D
:7
I/
A
HH
:I
H
6
C
9
O
I=
:G
C
D
C
IG
D
A
V
6
G
>6
7A
:H
P
a
n
el
A
.
W
h
o
le
p
er
io
d
(1
9
9
3
-1
9
9
6
,
1
9
9
9
-2
0
0
2
)
M
o
d
e
l
1
M
o
d
e
l
2
C
o
e
$
c
ie
n
t
t-
v
a
lu
e
C
o
e
$
c
ie
n
t
t-
v
a
lu
e
C
h
a
e
b
o
l
d
u
m
m
y
0
.1
3
4
0
5
.0
1
**
*
0
.2
0
9
8
6
.1
2
**
*
C
h
a
e
b
o
l*
p
o
st
c
ri
si
s
d
u
m
m
y
0
.1
7
2
8
3
.3
4
**
*
P
o
st
c
ri
si
s
d
u
m
m
y
0
.2
4
6
1
1
0
.0
1
**
*
R
e
si
d
u
a
l
o
f
lo
g
(
a
ss
e
ts
)
0
.0
0
9
2
0
.8
7
0
.0
2
5
0
2
.3
5
**
E
B
IT
/
sa
le
s
9
.6
6
3
0
4
1
.9
3
**
*
9
.5
1
1
1
4
2
.2
5
**
*
C
a
p
e
x
/
sa
le
s
0
.4
6
2
9
2
.8
5
**
*
0
.7
3
1
2
4
.5
8
**
*
D
e
b
t/
a
ss
e
ts
0
.4
2
9
0
9
.1
0
**
*
0
.5
9
3
0
1
2
.4
3
**
*
A
d
ju
st
e
d
R
2
0
.3
7
1
9
0
.4
0
2
5
N
o
.
o
f
O
b
s.
3
,2
5
4
3
,2
5
4
P
a
n
el
B
.
P
re
cr
is
is
p
er
io
d
(1
9
9
3
-1
9
9
6
)
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
3
-1
9
9
6
C
o
e
$
c
ie
n
t
t-
v
a
lu
e
C
o
e
$
c
ie
n
t
t-
v
a
lu
e
C
o
e
$
c
ie
n
t
t-
v
a
lu
e
C
o
e
$
c
ie
n
t
t-
v
a
lu
e
C
o
e
$
c
ie
n
t
t-
v
a
lu
e
C
h
a
e
b
o
l
d
u
m
m
y
0
.0
3
9
3
0
.6
0
0
.2
2
2
4
3
.4
4
**
*
0
.1
7
7
0
2
.9
7
**
*
0
.2
3
1
8
3
.4
3
**
*
0
.1
4
1
2
4
.3
8
**
*
R
e
si
d
u
a
l
o
f
lo
g
(
a
ss
e
ts
)
0
.0
3
2
2
1
.1
1
0
.0
2
9
7
1
.0
6
0
.0
0
0
7
0
.0
3
0
.0
5
7
2
2
.0
1
**
0
.0
3
3
3
2
.3
9
**
E
B
IT
/
sa
le
s
8
.3
1
2
1
1
4
.4
8
**
*
7
.7
4
3
5
1
3
.3
9
**
*
9
.0
0
9
6
1
6
.9
8
**
*
9
.1
3
7
7
1
5
.0
2
**
*
8
.4
3
8
5
2
9
.4
8
**
*
C
a
p
e
x
/
sa
le
s
1
.9
1
9
5
1
.4
3
0
.3
1
8
6
0
.7
3
0
.8
4
5
7
2
.3
7
**
1
.0
4
7
2
2
.8
5
**
*
0
.3
7
8
2
1
.8
9
*
D
e
b
t/
a
ss
e
ts
0
.0
9
2
3
0
.5
4
0
.1
0
7
3
0
.7
4
0
.1
5
2
9
1
.1
2
0
.1
3
1
5
0
.8
3
0
.0
6
9
9
0
.9
2
A
d
ju
st
e
d
R
2
0
.3
4
1
0
0
.3
1
0
6
0
.3
9
5
9
0
.3
4
5
8
0
.3
4
1
0
N
o
.
o
f
O
b
s.
4
1
0
4
2
6
4
4
3
4
4
5
1
,7
2
4
P
a
n
el
C
.
P
o
st
cr
is
is
p
er
io
d
(1
9
9
9
-2
0
0
2
)
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
1
9
9
9
-2
0
0
2
C
o
e
$
c
ie
n
t
t-
v
a
lu
e
C
o
e
$
c
ie
n
t
t-
v
a
lu
e
C
o
e
$
c
ie
n
t
t-
v
a
lu
e
C
o
e
$
c
ie
n
t
t-
v
a
lu
e
C
o
e
$
c
ie
n
t
t-
v
a
lu
e
C
h
a
e
b
o
l
d
u
m
m
y
0
.0
8
7
0
1
.1
4
0
.1
5
0
4
1
.9
9
**
0
.1
1
5
5
1
.3
3
0
.0
4
7
5
0
.4
8
0
.0
5
4
5
1
.2
8
R
e
si
d
u
a
l
o
f
lo
g
(
a
ss
e
ts
)
0
.0
2
9
2
1
.0
1
0
.0
2
9
2
1
.0
2
0
.0
1
8
6
0
.5
7
0
.0
4
8
4
1
.2
9
0
.0
0
0
3
0
.0
2
E
B
IT
/
sa
le
s
1
2
.0
8
1
7
1
8
.4
0
**
*
1
0
.8
2
7
8
1
6
.9
6
**
*
8
.9
2
1
8
1
3
.4
5
**
*
9
.9
1
5
9
1
3
.0
5
**
*
1
0
.4
1
7
2
3
0
.2
4
**
*
C
a
p
e
x
/
sa
le
s
1
.9
1
3
8
4
.1
3
**
*
1
.0
5
6
7
2
.5
4
**
1
.5
3
2
7
2
.6
9
**
*
0
.7
4
1
4
1
.2
9
1
.1
8
0
2
4
.7
4
**
*
D
e
b
t/
a
ss
e
ts
0
.9
4
4
1
7
.9
4
**
*
0
.8
9
5
5
8
.4
9
**
*
0
.9
7
4
3
8
.7
5
**
*
0
.4
1
6
3
2
.1
6
**
0
.8
2
4
1
1
3
.1
1
**
*
A
d
ju
st
e
d
R
2
0
.5
3
7
2
0
.5
1
3
1
0
.4
5
4
0
0
.3
3
5
4
0
.4
4
6
8
N
o
.
o
f
O
b
s.
3
9
7
3
9
7
3
5
3
3
8
3
1
,5
3
0
N
o
te
s:
E
x
c
e
ss
v
a
lu
e
b
y
E
B
IT
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
o
f
th
e
ra
ti
o
o
f
th
e
ﬁ
rm
’s
a
c
tu
a
l
v
a
lu
e
to
it
s
im
p
u
te
d
v
a
lu
e
u
si
n
g
th
e
E
B
IT
m
u
lt
ip
li
e
r.
T
h
e
ﬁ
rm
’s
a
c
tu
a
l
v
a
lu
e
is
th
e
su
m
o
f
th
e
m
a
rk
e
t
v
a
lu
e
o
f
th
e
c
o
m
m
o
n
st
o
c
k
,
th
e
b
o
o
k
v
a
lu
e
o
f
th
e
p
re
fe
rr
e
d
st
o
c
k
,
a
n
d
th
e
b
o
o
k
v
a
lu
e
o
f
a
n
y
d
e
b
t.
T
h
e
im
p
u
te
d
v
a
lu
e
u
si
n
g
th
e
E
B
IT
m
u
lt
ip
li
e
r
is
th
e
ﬁ
rm
’s
o
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
in
c
o
m
e
ti
m
e
s
th
e
in
d
u
st
ry
-y
e
a
r
m
e
d
ia
n
c
a
p
it
a
l-
to
-o
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
in
c
o
m
e
ra
ti
o
(
i.
e
.,
a
c
tu
a
l
v
a
lu
e
d
iv
id
e
d
b
y
o
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
in
c
o
m
e
)
.
C
h
a
e
b
o
l
d
u
m
m
y
ta
k
e
s
th
e
v
a
lu
e
o
f
1
w
h
e
n
a
ﬁ
rm
’s
b
u
si
n
e
ss
g
ro
u
p
is
ra
n
k
e
d
in
th
e
to
p
3
0
o
n
a
b
a
si
s
o
f
to
ta
l
a
ss
e
ts
(
th
e
su
m
o
f
th
e
to
ta
l
a
ss
e
ts
o
f
a
ll
a
$
li
a
te
d
c
o
m
p
a
n
ie
s
b
e
lo
n
g
in
g
to
th
e
sa
m
e
b
u
si
n
e
ss
g
ro
u
p
)
a
t
th
e
ﬁ
sc
a
l
y
e
a
r-
e
n
d
,
a
n
d
z
e
ro
w
h
e
n
th
e
ﬁ
rm
’s
b
u
si
n
e
ss
g
ro
u
p
is
ra
n
k
e
d
b
e
lo
w
th
e
to
p
5
0
o
r
w
h
e
n
th
e
ﬁ
rm
is
n
o
t
a
m
e
m
b
e
r
o
f
a
n
y
b
u
si
n
e
ss
g
ro
u
p
.
C
h
a
e
b
o
l*
p
o
st
c
ri
si
s
d
u
m
m
y
is
th
e
p
ro
d
u
c
t
o
f
c
h
a
e
b
o
l
d
u
m
m
y
m
u
lt
ip
li
e
d
b
y
p
o
st
c
ri
si
s
d
u
m
m
y
.
P
o
st
c
ri
si
s
d
u
m
m
y
ta
k
e
s
th
e
v
a
lu
e
1
w
h
e
n
th
e
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
is
in
th
e
p
o
st
c
ri
si
s
p
e
ri
o
d
(
1
9
9
9
-2
0
0
2
)
a
n
d
z
e
ro
w
h
e
n
it
is
in
p
re
c
ri
si
s
p
e
ri
o
d
(
1
9
9
3
-1
9
9
6
)
.
R
e
si
d
u
a
l
o
f
lo
g
(
a
ss
e
ts
)
is
th
e
re
si
d
u
a
l
o
f
th
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
o
f
lo
g
(
a
ss
e
ts
)
o
n
c
h
a
e
b
o
l
d
u
m
m
y
.
L
o
g
(
a
ss
e
ts
)
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
o
f
th
e
to
ta
l
a
ss
e
ts
.
E
B
IT
/
sa
le
s
is
th
e
ra
ti
o
o
f
o
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
in
c
o
m
e
to
sa
le
s.
C
a
p
e
x
/
sa
le
s
is
th
e
ra
ti
o
o
f
c
a
p
it
a
l
e
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
s
to
sa
le
s.
D
e
b
t/
a
ss
e
ts
is
th
e
ra
ti
o
o
f
to
ta
l
d
e
b
t
to
to
ta
l
a
ss
e
ts
.
*
si
g
n
iﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
th
e
5
-1
0
%
le
v
e
l.
**
si
g
n
iﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
th
e
1
-5
%
le
v
e
l.
**
*
si
g
n
iﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
le
ss
th
a
n
1
%
le
v
e
l.
2 0 0 7 ] K 6 A J : 9 > H 8 D J C I D ; 7 J H > C : H H < G D J E H H J G G D J C 9 > C < I = : 6 H > 6 C ; > C 6 C 8 > 6 A 8 G > H > H + 2 +
found conclusive evidence that chaebol ﬁrms in Korea su#er value loss relative to their
non-chaebol counterparts. Particularly, in the precrisis period, under a government-driven
development policy, chaebol ﬁrms strategically sought external growth and diversiﬁcation and,
thus, did not pursue the maximization of shareholder value. Also, chaebol ﬁrms expropriated
minority shareholders’ wealth by arbitrarily shifting values from one a$liate to another. Ferris
et al. further reported that precrisis chaebols relied heavily on internal capital markets,
practicing overinvestment and cross-subsidization.
However, after the ﬁnancial crisis, various reforms created signiﬁcant changes in the
Korean economy that resulted in an increase in the ﬁrm value of chaebols. For example, in the
postcrisis period, corporate governance was improved and transparency was enhanced.
Internal capital markets were contracted and arbitrary transactions among a$liates were more
closely monitored. Also, more advanced disclosure policies were adopted and shareholders’
rights were strengthened.
As an extension of Ferris et al.’s (2003) use of Tobin’s q, excess value by EBIT, and
excess value by assets as measures of ﬁrm value, this study examines and compares the e#ect
of group membership on ﬁrm value in both the precrisis (1993-1996) and postcrisis (1999-
2002) periods in Korea. Results show that chaebol ﬁrms su#ered value discount relative to
non-chaebol ﬁrms in the precrisis period, which is consistent with Ferris et al. However, we
also ﬁnd that the value discount found in Korean chaebols in the precrisis period disappears
under the reformed business practice of the postcrisis period, implying that the beneﬁts of
diversiﬁcation dominate its costs in postcrisis Korea. These results suggest that the value
discount of business groups reported in prior studies is not an inevitable consequence of
diversiﬁcation. Thus, this study contributes to the understanding of certain economic condi-
tions under which the value discount of diversiﬁcation is alleviated, enabling ﬁrms to increase
ﬁrm value through diversiﬁcation.
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